

That Day In Dallas: Here We Go Again

An Analysis of the Documents in the Case

The three documents on which the latest Kennedy assassination conspiracy hoax rest were allegedly drafted and sent by someone who twice gives his name as "C. Bowers" (with "OHSA" under his name), and once as "C. Bower."

Bower is allegedly an official of the Office of Naval Intelligence, operating under instructions from the Central Intelligence Agency, and the documents allegedly are passing instructions from the CIA to an ONI "operative," a patrolman of the Dallas police force.

Beyond any question, the person who concocted these documents never served in any executive capacity with any arm of the United States government, and has never drafted, handled, or even been exposed to, any form of government communications.

All government communications — signals, cables and dispatches, from intra-office messages to classified operation orders, have a number of factors in common:

a) The originating office is clearly identified; the message may be signed by an individual, but the originator is not the individual but the bureaucratic entity he represents.

b) The recipient — again a bureaucratic entity — is specified, as are the specific information addressees.

c) A date-time group is part of the heading.

d) A file number is also part of the heading. While filing systems differ, all are designed to positively identify a specific message, sequentially among all messages, so that the message may be referenced and retrieved as necessary.

e) Virtually all governmental messages (as opposed to the numerous studies, analyses and the like which are also written) are precisely written and to the point. This is especially true of the military. Messages serve to issue, amend and cancel commands (or orders, which in contradistinction to commands do not specify how something is to be done, but merely state the objective), or to request or provide specific information. Messages are not used for broad generalities, and they do not hint.

f) Although messages may be drafted by subordinates, they are signed by the officer in charge of the bureaucratic entity involved — the originator.

The concoctor of these documents was ignorant of all such principles.

Items:

Traffic, whether cable or dispatch, is always drafted with a heading along the following lines:

From:
To:
Subject:
Reference(s):
Info:

date/time group

The forgeries display ignorance of this. The originator is given as "Navy Int." - an abbreviation that no one in government (and especially the Navy) would ever use (and "intelligence," if abbreviated, would be "intel," not "int" - the forger, having seen such acronyms as HUMINT, SIGINT and ELINT, apparently assumed that "int." was the common abbreviation for "intelligence"). The proper term would be the adjectival form "naval intelligence," but no one in government would ever use this in a heading, or anywhere else. They would use "ONI," in writing or in conversation.

But "ONI" would never stand alone in a heading; it would be modified to indicate the actual originator - "C/ONI" (for "Chief of Naval Intelligence"), or "ONI/Op021-E" - to indicate the originating desk. The argument that this was omitted because it was "secret" is ludicrous; if the originating office was a temporary, classified unit, it would omit all reference to ONI.

In 1983, moreover, virtually the whole of ONI - the operational branches and personnel -- had long been transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency, with the Navy Department retaining only a vestigial remnant (for internal criminal investigation and the like); the few agent operations ONI had run, together with their support structures, had gone to the DIA.

"Code A MRC" is meaningless. Traffic is either cleartext or encrypted; much classified traffic is cleartext but uses "cryptonyms" to render the dispatch or cable meaningless if it physically falls into the wrong hands. ("While in ABWAVE, CDWIDGET visited the EFSMEGMA premises to confer with CDWIDGET-2.")

A cryptonym is not to be confused with a "pseudonym," a false name used in official traffic to conceal the identity. A pseudonym is assigned, for example, on entering on duty with the CIA, and is used throughout a career, to sign "internal use only" traffic, pay chits and the like. It is never used with the public, or any paperwork which will be disclosed to non-Agency personnel. Pseudonyms are invariably full first names, a middle initial and a last name, and are used only in that format; the first name is never abbreviated to an initial. (In a short intra-office memo or note, the three initials, known to all in that office, might be used - "Cia. A. Tafolla" might sign a note to his secretary "CAT," but would never sign anything "C.A. Tafolla.") The purpose of this rigmarole is simple; no piece of paper will ever identify a true name as an employee of the CIA - or any other organization using pseudonyms.

The sub-signature acronym "OSHA" is meaningless; no such bureaucratic entity existed in 1963 (although the "Occupational Safety and Health" administration of the Department of Labor uses it today.)

Nothing in encrypted traffic, including the heading, can be read. The word "code" is never used in official traffic, since codes aren't used. In a code, standing five-letter groups, which do not change, replace words or phrases; they were used, especially in diplomatic traffic, through the second World War, but since they are cumbersome, a nuisance to devise, easily broken (or lost or stolen), and then difficult to replace, they have long fallen out of use. Naval vessels have "signal code" books, giving the meaning for three- or four-letter flag hoists, but these are only used in visual signal traffic between ships.

Encryption may involve all manner of systems, in which the same encrypted letter never stands twice for the same cleartext letter. No one in government, above all in an intelligence organization, would refer to anything as "Code A MRC," "Code AAA," or "Code" anything-else.

The terms "Remarks data," and "Remarks Mandarin: Code A:" are meaningless drivel; no such phraseology, or anything approaching it, has ever appeared in official traffic from any source. The three texts, moreover, do not display any form of "coding" or encryption -- they are entirely in cleartext.

"1666106" is, reportedly, the Navy serial number of an actual person. All military personnel are issued overt serial numbers; they are used on dog tags and in all official correspondence for specific identification. There may be three "J. Fred Muggs" in the Navy, but "LCDR J. Fred Muggs, USN/501703" pins down which one. Serial numbers are never used alone -- and would never be used to "hide" an identity; since they are easily traced, they hide nothing.

The "slugs" at the bottom of the documents, "Re-rifle," "Code AAA" and "destroy / on /" are also meaningless. Slugs are used on traffic as routing indicators, showing degrees of sensitivity, or general areas of interest, to determine distribution of information copies. They do not contain instructions, or encryption system indicators.

Only bad novels and TV melodramas have slugs like "Eyes only," "Burn immediately" or the like. Each organization has its own bill for the destruction of classified material -- which is not the job of the recipient of the message.

Date/time groups do not take the form "SEPT. 83." The day will be given, and the year written out in full, and the month would not be abbreviated, using upper case letters. The system would vary from organization to organization, but this would still hold -- a cable might read "06091963/1440; a dispatch "6 September, 1963" and omit the time group.

As to contents: These messages purport to be from an ONI official, under CIA aegis, to an "operative" (a term never employed in the intelligence community) in the Dallas police force. Such a chain of command is in itself impossible, and the argument that these were "special" units formed for the purpose is specious.

Liaison between all bureaucratic entities is strictly controlled and monitored; there is never operational contact outside of the established channels. Subordinates in one organization do not have unmonitored contact with subordinates in other organizations. Despite fond public belief, the CIA does not engage in domestic operational activity — domestic support operations to back overseas operations are a different category.

Neither the DIA nor ONI have ever engaged in agent operations to any extent (their collection programs are overwhelmingly technical), and neither organization maintains the extensive archive registers or support facilities agent operations require. Only the CIA and the FBI maintain such facilities.

They may have "informants," or "sources," but in no sense are these witting, controlled agents. An ONI field office in 1963, for example, might have had a contact in the Dallas police department, to assist in acquisition of personnel records for background investigations (for clearances, or even enlistments) — ~~but~~ but such trace requests would be laid on through the chief of the police department, never by a direct approach to a subordinate. The police chief would select the contact — who would not be a patrolman but a clerical type working in registry.

If — for argument's sake! — a CIA official had decided to mount a presidential assassination, he, and any like-minded associates, would have to operate entirely outside the Agency framework — on their own. No such project could conceivably be engineered within the organization without dozens becoming aware of it. And, if such a group approached an ONI official, the approach would immediately be reported to the Chief of ONI, who would come back through proper liaison channels to find out what the hell was going on. There is simply no way any CIA personnel could secure ONI cooperation in running a Dallas patrolman (through an ONI field office), nor would any such group of trained and experienced agent handlers, engaged in such a critical operation, make use of a third-hand, uncontrolled agent, working through another at least two levels of another organization — with little or no experience in agent operations (let alone presidential assassinations).

The alleged recipient, an uncontrolled contact with no intelligence training, is in these three messages told nothing — they consist of broad generalities, with no specific instructions, about matters which are none of his business, and which would simply puzzle him. "Foreign affairs assignments have been cancelled?" What has this to do with him? What "foreign assignments" did he have? "The next assignment is to eliminate a national security threat to world wide peace?" This provides no instructions, it is merely a hint of some kind (and is something of a non sequitur). Were he to be used, he would be met in person for briefing and training. Not only is the alleged chain of command farcical, the messages are absurd.

Taken together, they try to give the impression of an extensive group, with all manner of "assignments." But in handling a sensitive group, identical messages about group operations and assignments aren't sent broadcast to all; each member will have specific instructions sent to him. These messages mix general comments applying to the entire network (which, since they involve control matters, wouldn't go to network members anyway) with hazy statements applying to the alleged Dallas recipient.

A final note. Official traffic is drafted by people several rungs up the ladder of command; improper phraseology, misspellings, tautologies, grammatical mistakes would not be tolerated for a moment. The author of this nonsense, if he even reached high school, obviously failed all his English classes.

"Forgein" is not a typo, but a crashing misspelling; no one in the intelligence community would make such an error. "Dallas destination chosen. Your place hidden within the department. Contacts are within this letter. Continue on (!) as planned," "Reply back (!) if not understood," "Witnesses have eyes, ears and mouths," "You [illegible] do of the mix up," "The men will be in to cover all misleading evidence soon," — this is the phrasing and grammar of an unlettered ignoramus trying to ape his betters — who in a thousand years would never have been hired by either ONI or the CIA, or in a million have risen beyond the level of janitor, if he did get aboard.

It is the work of a bird-brain who has read too many Fu Manchu novels, and watched too many episodes of Mission Impossible and The Man From U.N.C.L.E.

No one considering such an earth-shaking operation as the assassination of a president would dream of employing the insecure chain of command indicated, or employ garrulous agents they had not personally investigated and recruited and tested, or employ anyone with the abysmal command of English herein displayed; there would be virtually nothing committed to paper, and above all, incriminating messages would not contain overt traces of the originator's actual identity — and then be sent to uncontrolled people over an insecure land-line (claiming technological devices which didn't exist in 1963). All contacts would be in person. Lee Harvey Oswald succeeded precisely because he was a loner.

To refer to this garbage as "bull shit" would be a gratuitous insult to an honorable, respected colloquial term. "Monkey barf" might do.

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